The Hunt Brothers’ attempt to corner the silver market is one of the most dramatic episodes in commodity market history — and one of the most mythologized. It’s invoked regularly in precious metals discussions, usually to illustrate either the boundless upside of silver or the ruthlessness of financial regulators. The reality is more interesting, and more complicated, than either version.
Who Were the Hunts?
Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt were the sons of H.L. Hunt, a Texas oilman who built one of the largest private fortunes in American history. By the 1970s, the brothers were among the wealthiest people in the world, with interests in oil, real estate, and various commodity positions.
Both Hunts were deeply skeptical of paper money. In the context of the 1970s — double-digit inflation, Nixon’s closing of the gold window in 1971, the apparent decline of U.S. monetary credibility — this skepticism was shared by many serious investors. Their silver accumulation was not simply a speculative bet; they described it as a hedge against what they saw as the inevitable debasement of the dollar.
The Accumulation
The Hunts began accumulating silver positions in the early-to-mid 1970s. They purchased physical silver and silver futures, taking delivery of an unusually large fraction of their futures positions rather than rolling or liquidating them before expiration — which is the standard practice.
Stephen Fay’s account in Beyond Greed (1982), drawing on court documents and participant interviews, is the primary detailed record of what happened. According to Fay’s reconstruction, by the late 1970s the Hunts, in concert with several Saudi Arabian partners and associates, controlled roughly 100 million troy ounces of silver — a position equivalent to roughly a third of the world’s annual mine production at the time and a significant fraction of above-ground non-government supply.
They were not alone. The Hunts worked with a group of Saudi investors through a syndicate called IMIC (International Metals Investment Company). The collective position was massive by any measure.
The Price Run
Silver’s price in 1978 was approximately $5–6 per troy ounce. Through 1979, as the Hunt-IMIC accumulation continued and broader inflation fears drove commodity prices higher, silver rose dramatically.
By January 1980, silver reached an intraday high of approximately $49.45 per troy ounce — commonly cited in press reports and in Fay’s account. Some sources quote $50 as a round number; $49.45 appears in contemporaneous reporting as the peak. The run from $6 to $49 in roughly 18 months was extraordinary.
To put that in context: at $49.45, the Hunts’ 100-million-ounce position was nominally worth nearly $5 billion — at a time when a billion dollars was still a serious amount of money.
Silver Rule 7
The price run did not escape regulatory notice.
In January 1980, both the Commodity Exchange (COMEX) in New York and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) took emergency action. They imposed what became known as “Silver Rule 7” — a rule that prohibited the opening of new long positions in silver futures. Existing positions could be maintained or liquidated, but no new long exposure could be added through futures.
The effect was immediate. The only direction traders could go in the futures market was out. Selling pressure intensified. Buyers had been cut off.
The Hunts and their supporters viewed this as a deliberate attack on their position — a rigged game where the rules were changed mid-play to protect the short sellers on the other side of the market (many of whom were major financial institutions). Their critics viewed it as a necessary emergency measure to prevent a corner — an anticompetitive accumulation of market power that would have allowed the Hunts to dictate prices.
Both sides had a point, which is part of what makes the episode so interesting.
Silver Thursday
The collapse came fast.
“Silver Thursday” typically refers to the period of January 17–21, 1980 (the specific date varies by source; January 17 is most commonly cited as the triggering day). Silver prices plunged. By March 27, 1980 — the date most often cited in financial histories as the true Silver Thursday — silver had fallen to approximately $10.80 per troy ounce, down from the $49 peak.
The Hunts faced margin calls they could not immediately meet. A $1.1 billion emergency loan was arranged through a consortium of U.S. banks, coordinated with some involvement from the Federal Reserve. Without that loan, the Hunts’ forced selling would have driven prices even lower, potentially triggering defaults throughout the commodity brokerage system.
This is worth sitting with: the U.S. government and banking system effectively bailed out the individuals who had caused the crisis. The alternative — a wave of brokerage defaults — was apparently judged worse.
Aftermath
The legal and regulatory consequences unfolded over years.
The CFTC brought a case. Civil litigation followed. Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt eventually settled with the CFTC in 1989, agreeing to pay fines and accept trading restrictions without admitting or denying the allegations. Nelson Bunker Hunt filed for personal bankruptcy in 1988 — though he later recovered a degree of financial stability.
The episode produced significant regulatory reform: stricter position limits in commodity markets, enhanced oversight of large accumulations, and clearer rules about exchange emergency powers.
What It Actually Shows
The Hunt Brothers episode illustrates several things simultaneously:
It shows that commodity corners are possible, up to a point. The Hunts came closer to controlling a global commodity market than anyone in the modern era. They accumulated an extraordinary fraction of available supply.
It shows that markets and regulators respond. Silver Rule 7 was an exchange-level intervention, not a government one. The exchanges rewrote the rules to prevent the corner from completing. Whether that was appropriate is still debated.
It shows that price and value can diverge dramatically when a single large buyer distorts supply and demand signals. The $49 price did not reflect a fundamental reassessment of silver’s value — it reflected a supply squeeze created by the Hunts’ accumulation and financing arrangements.
It is not evidence of ongoing suppression. Some silver advocates cite the Hunt episode as proof that powerful actors control silver prices — and they use it in reverse, to argue that silver is now suppressed. The episode shows that large actors can move markets, which is true. It doesn’t establish a permanent institutional suppression of silver prices; the CFTC and multiple subsequent investigations have not found that.
The Bottom Line
The Hunt Brothers’ silver corner is a genuine, dramatic story of market power, regulatory response, and spectacular financial reversal. It belongs in any serious account of silver market history. It also needs to be told accurately: a specific event in a specific set of circumstances, not a template for understanding every subsequent silver price movement.
Sources
[1] Stephen Fay, Beyond Greed (Viking Press, 1982). The definitive account, drawing on court documents and participant interviews.
[2] CME Group / COMEX, historical exchange rules and Silver Rule 7 documentation. Referenced in Fay [1] and contemporaneous press accounts.
[3] Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), enforcement records related to Hunt Brothers proceedings. cftc.gov
[4] Contemporaneous reporting in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times, January–March 1980. Available via newspaper archives.